Network node and method for detecting false base stations

ABSTRACT

A method performed by a network node, for detecting a false base station in a communications network. The network node operates in the communication network and is adapted to serve a network device via a serving Radio Access, RA, node. The network node sends a message to a network device, which message comprises configuration data configuring the network device to perform measurements in order to collect information transmitted by network nodes in a surrounding area of the network device. The network node further receives a message comprising measurement reports from the network device according to the configuration. The network node further provides an indication that a false base station is present when a difference between the received information in the measurement report and a predetermined target information is detected.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.14/902,508, having a 371(c) date of Dec. 31, 2015 (published as US20160309332), which is a national stage of International Application No.PCT/EP2015/079764, filed on Dec. 15, 2015, which claims priority to U.S.provisional application No. 62/094,098, filed on Dec. 19, 2014. Theabove identified applications and publication are incorporated byreference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

Embodiments herein relate to a network node and a method therein. Inparticular, it relates to a method and a network node for detecting afalse base station.

BACKGROUND

Communication devices such as mobile terminals are enabled tocommunicate wirelessly in a cellular communications network or wirelesscommunication system, sometimes also referred to as a cellular radiosystem or cellular networks. The communication may be performed e.g.between two mobile terminals, between a mobile terminal and a regulartelephone and/or between a mobile terminal and a server via a RadioAccess Network (RAN) and possibly one or more core networks, comprisedwithin the cellular communications network.

Mobile terminals may further be referred to as User Equipment (UE),wireless communication devices, wireless devices, wireless terminals,mobile stations, mobile telephones, cellular telephones, laptops, tabletcomputers or surf plates with wireless capability, just to mention somefurther examples. The mobile terminals in the present context may be,for example, portable, pocket-storable, hand-held, computer-comprised,or vehicle-mounted mobile devices, enabled to communicate voice and/ordata, via the RAN, with another entity, such as another wirelessterminal or a server.

The cellular communications network covers a geographical area which isdivided into cell areas, wherein each cell area being served by a radionetwork node, which typically is referred to as a base station. A cellis the geographical area where radio coverage is provided by the radionetwork node. The cellular communications network may be an LTE,E-UTRAN, WCDMA, GSM network, any 3GPP cellular network, WiMax, or anywireless network or system. In some embodiments the non-limiting termradio network node is more commonly used and it refers to any type ofnetwork node serving mobile terminal and/or connected to other networknode or network element or any radio node from where mobile terminalreceives signal. Examples of radio network nodes are Node B, BaseStation (BS), Multi-Standard Radio (MSR) radio node such as MSR BS,eNode B, network controller, Radio Network Controller (RNC), basestation controller, relay, donor node controlling relay, BaseTransceiver Station (BTS), Access Point (AP), transmission points,transmission nodes, RRU, RRH, nodes in distributed antenna system (DAS)etc.

The radio network node may further control several transmission points,e.g. having Radio Units (RRUs). A cell may thus comprise one or moreradio network nodes each controlling one or more transmission/receptionpoints. A transmission point, also referred to as atransmission/reception point, is an entity that transmits and/orreceives radio signals. The entity has a position in space, e.g. anantenna. A network node is an entity that controls one or moretransmission points. The network node may e.g. be a base station such asa Radio Base Station (RBS), eNB, eNodeB, NodeB, B node, or BaseTransceiver Station (BTS), depending on the technology and terminologyused. The base stations may be of different classes such as e.g. macroeNodeB, home eNodeB or pico base station, based on transmission powerand thereby also cell size.

In some embodiments a more general term “network node” is used and itmay correspond to any type of radio network node or any network node,which communicates with at least a radio network node. Examples ofnetwork nodes are any radio network node stated above; a core networknode, such as e.g. a Mobile Switching Centre (MSC), a MobilityManagement Entity (MME), an Operations & Management (O&M) node, anOperation, Administration and Maintenance (OAM) node, an OperationsSupport Systems (OSS) node, a Self-Organizing Network (SON) node, apositioning node, such as e.g. an Enhanced Serving Mobile LocationCentre (E-SMLC), or a function related Minimization of Drive Tests (MDT)etc.

In some embodiments the non-limiting term network device is used and itrefers to any type of wireless device communicating with a network nodein a cellular or mobile communication system and being able to performmeasurements on other network nodes in a surrounding or tracking area ofthe network device. Examples of a network device are UE, mobileterminal, target device, device to device UE, machine type UE or UEcapable of machine to machine communication, PDA, iPAD, Tablet, mobileterminals, smart phone, Laptop Embedded Equipment (LEE), Laptop MountedEquipment (LME), USB dongles, radio network node, radio access node etc.

Further, each network node may support one or several communicationtechnologies. The network nodes communicate over the air interfaceoperating on radio frequencies with the mobile terminals within range ofthe network node. In the context of this disclosure, the expressionDownlink (DL) is used for the transmission path from the base station tothe mobile station. The expression Uplink (UL) is used for thetransmission path in the opposite direction i.e. from the mobileterminal to the base station.

In 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE),network nodes, which may be referred to as eNodeBs or even eNBs, may bedirectly connected to one or more core networks. In LTE the cellularcommunication network is also referred to as Evolved UniversalTerrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN).

An E-UTRAN cell is defined by certain signals which are broadcasted fromthe eNB. These signals contain information about the cell which may beused by mobile terminals in order to connect to the network through thecell. The signals comprise reference and synchronization signals whichthe mobile terminal uses to find frame timing and physical cellidentification as well as system information which comprises parametersrelevant for the whole cell.

The architecture of an LTE system is shown in FIG. 1, including radioaccess nodes, e.g. base stations, such as e.g. eNBs, Home eNBs—HeNBs orHeNB GateWay (GW), and evolved packet core nodes, such as e.g. MobilityManagement Entity (MME) or Serving GateWay (S-GW). As can be seen a S1interface connects the HeNBs/eNBs to the MME/S-GW and HeNBs to the HeNBGW, while an X2 interface connects peer eNBs/HeNBs.

A management system LTE system of FIG. 1 is shown in FIG. 2. The NodeElements (NE) 200, which may also be referred to as eNodeBs or radioaccess nodes (base stations), are managed by a Domain Manager (DM) 210,which may also be referred to as an Operation and Support System (OSS).A DM 210 may further be managed by a network manager (NM) 220. Two NEs200 are interfaced by an X2 interface, whereas the interface between twoDMs 210 may be referred to as Itf-P2P. The management system mayconfigure the NEs 200, as well as receive observations associated tofeatures in the NEs 200. For example, a DM 210 observes and configuresone or more NEs 200, while a NM 220 observes and configures one or moreDM 210, as well as one or more NEs 200 via the one or more DMs 210.

By means of configuration via the DM 210, the NM 220 and their relatedinterfaces, functions over the X2 and S1 interfaces may be carried outin a coordinated way throughout the RAN, eventually involving the CoreNetwork, such as e.g. a MME and/or S-GWs.

FIG. 3 discloses a 3G architecture corresponding to the LTE architectureshown in FIG. 1. Here the Core Network is formed by nodes such as aServing GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and a Mobile Switching Centre (MSC),which connect to a Radio Network Controller (RNC) and a Home NodeB (HNB)Gate Way (GW) via a Iu interface. The RNC connects to NodeBs (basestations) via a Iub interface while the HNB GW connects to the HNBs viaa so called Iuh interface. HNBs may connect to each other via a socalled Iurh interface, while RNCs connect to each other and to HNB GWsvia a Iur interface.

The 3G OAM system follows the same structure as described for LTE shownin FIG. 2. The NEs 200 in FIG. 2 would correspond to RNCs and NBs inFIG. 3. If the NE is an HNB, the DM 210 would correspond to the HMS.

In LTE the mobile terminal may be in either idle state, which is alsoreferred to as IDLE or RRC_IDLE, or in connected state, which state isalso referred to as CONNECTED or RRC_CONNECTED. When the mobile terminalis in RRC_IDLE, it monitors a paging channel, which paging channel ispart of a Common Control Channel (CCCH).

The suitable cell is commonly the cell with best quality of signal.Listening for a suitable cell may comprise searching for referencesignals transmitted from the network node. When a suitable cell is foundthe mobile terminal performs random access, according to a systeminformation for the cell. This is done in order to transmit a RadioResource Control (RRC) connection setup request to the network node.Assuming the random access procedure succeeds and the network nodereceives the request, the network node will either answer with an RRCconnection setup message, which acknowledges the mobile terminalsrequest and tells it to move into RRC connected state, or an RRCconnection reject, which tells the mobile terminal that it may notconnect to the cell. In RRC connected state the parameters necessary forcommunication between the network node and the mobile terminal are knownto both entities and a data transfer between the two entities isenabled.

When the mobile terminal is in RRC_CONNECTED state the mobile terminalmay continue to measure RSRP, in order to be able to report a ChannelQuality Indication (CQI) as well as an input to connected mode mobilitydecisions, such as e.g. performing a handover from one cell to another.

In order to support the mobile terminal in connecting to a cell, whichmay also be referred to as accessing a cell, System Information Blocks(SIBs) are transmitted in the control channel. A number of differentSIBs are defined, which are characterized by the information they arecarrying. For example, cell access related parameters, such asinformation about the operator of the cell, restrictions to what usersmay access the cell and the allocation of subframes to uplink/downlinkmay be carried by the SIBs.

However, a so-called “false base station” in a telecommunication systemmay impersonate a service providers real network nodes in order to lurea UE into connecting to the false base station. The false base stationmay then monitor and record data and voice traffic, as well as theposition of the UE, which may be used to collect information about auser.

SUMMARY

It is an object of embodiments herein to provide a method for addressingissues outlined above.

According to a first aspect of embodiments herein, the object isachieved by a method, performed by a network node, for detecting a falsebase station in a communications network.

In one example herein, the network node operates in the communicationnetwork and is adapted to serve a network device via a serving RadioAccess (RA) node. The network node may send a message to a networkdevice, which message comprises configuration data configuring thenetwork device to perform measurements in order to collect informationtransmitted by network nodes in a surrounding area of the networkdevice. The network node may further receive a message comprisingmeasurement reports from the network device according to theconfiguration. The network node further provides an indication that afalse base station is present when a difference between the receivedinformation in the measurement report and a predetermined targetinformation is detected.

According to a second aspect of embodiments herein, the object isachieved by a network node for performing the method for detecting afalse base station in a communications network.

The network node operates in the communication network and is adapted toserve a network device via a serving Radio Access (RA) node. The networknode is configured to send a message to a network device, which messagecomprises configuration data for configuring the network device toperform measurements in order to collect information transmitted bynetwork nodes in a surrounding area of the network device. The networknode is further configured to receive a message comprising measurementreports from the network device according to the configuration. Thenetwork node provide an indication that a false base station is present,when a difference between the received information in the measurementreport and the predetermined target information has been detected.

The embodiments of the method described herein have the advantage thatthe implementation is very cost effective, since the implementation ofthe embodiments do not require a hardware upgrade of currentcommunication networks, but only requiring a software upgrade of these.The software may e.g. be installed and/or updated in existing hardwareremotely, which may also be referred to as from a location differentthan the location where the hardware is placed. Hence, there is no needfor personnel to travel to the location of the hardware to perform theupdate, which reduces the costs for implementing the method describedherein.

This allows an operator to collect and analyze data of the networksurroundings in order to identify suspicious activity which may indicatea false base station raise an alarm when suspicious measurements.

A further advantage with the embodiments herein is that they allow acollection of measurements over a large coverage area, since eachnetwork device may perform measurements in the networks surroundings ofthe network device. Hence, a faster and more efficient detection offalse base stations is provided.

The embodiments herein further allow the operator to gradually collectdetailed data in narrowed down areas to enhance detection of false basestations, and thereby gradually raise a warning level by means ofdifferent levels of anomalies detections. Thereby, the operators areable to address a regulators' concerns regarding false base stations andIMSI catchers.

Moreover, the embodiments herein allow an operator to perform real-timecollection and analysis of data directly from the communicationsnetwork, in order to detect a false base station in a fast and efficientway.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Examples of embodiments herein are described in more detail withreference to attached drawings in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of an LTEwireless communications network.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of amanagement system for a wireless communications network.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of an 3Gwireless communications network.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating embodiments of a method in a networknode.

FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an ANR functionaccording to some embodiments herein.

FIG. 6 is a signalling diagram depicting configuration of a MDT-testaccording to some embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating embodiments of a method in a networkdevice.

FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a network nodeaccording to some embodiments herein.

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a network deviceaccording to some embodiments herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Current telecommunication systems may be vulnerable to attacks from afalse base station. The reason for this is that the mobile terminal maynot determine whether requests for a long term mobile terminal identity,which applies to e.g. GSM, 3G and LTE RATs, or requests for use ofno-encryption, which applies e.g. to GSM, comes from a legitimatenetwork or not. It is hence difficult to prevent false base stationattacks without large modifications to the radio protocols. The falsebase station may be any radio network node which may be able to serve anetwork device, such as a mobile terminal, and wherein the false basestation may impersonate a legitimate network node towards the networkdevice. Hence, the network device will interpret the false base stationas a legitimate network node.

Nevertheless, false base station attacks do occur and it would bebeneficial to have security controls to counter the attacks.

The class of attacks commonly referred to as false base station attackscomprises several different types of attacks. Two important types arethe so called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcherand the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. The purpose of the MITM attackis to act as an invisible proxy between the mobile terminal and thenetwork to be able to eavesdrop on the mobile terminals calls. The IMSIcatcher attack consists of requesting the long term identity from themobile terminal. To accomplish the latter, the IMSI catcher impersonatesa real network towards the mobile terminal, and requests the identitywhen the terminal tries to connect. The purpose of running an IMSIcatcher is to track which users are present in a given area. It doeshowever not eavesdrop on traffic.

A common component in all attacks in this class is that the false basestation impersonates a legitimate network node towards the mobileterminal. To lure the mobile terminal to select a cell hosted by thefalse base station, the false base station may use a stronger signal.Thereby, the false base station appears more attractive to the mobileterminal. Alternatively, the false base station may disturb thefrequency bands used by nearby legitimate base stations so that its ownsignal becomes stronger in comparison. Other methods to attract mobileterminals are based on broadcasting certain pieces of information thattricks the mobile terminal to believe it will receive better servicefrom the false base station.

When the mobile terminal has selected a cell of the false base station,the mobile terminal will attempt to connect to the network representedby the false base station. Such a connection typically comprises sendinga Location Area Update Request, a Tracking Area Update request or AttachRequest message to the false base station. This is the exact samebehavior the mobile terminal would show against a legitimate network.When connecting to a network, whether the network is legitimate or not,there may not be any security keys established between the network andthe mobile terminal. For this reason, the mobile terminal must alwaysaccept that the network requests the long term identity InternationalMobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) as part of the connection procedure. Alegitimate network would obtain authentication information in the formof so-called Authentication Vectors from the subscriber's home networkbased on this IMSI, authenticate the mobile terminal and then activatesecurity. A false base station, and an IMSI catcher in particular, makesuse of this fact and sends an identity request in response to the mobileterminals connection attempt. Since the mobile terminal may notdistinguish between the legitimate network and the false base station,the mobile terminal will reply with its IMSI unencrypted.

Once the false base station has retrieved the IMSI it may terminate theconnection to the mobile terminal. There are several ways to achievethis; some are more graceful than others. The false base station may forexample send a Location Area or Tracking Area Reject message indicatingthat the mobile terminal should try to connect to a different network. Acruder approach is to simply stop communicating with the mobile terminalafter obtaining the IMSI.

Clearly, it is problematic that the mobile terminal may not distinguishbetween legitimate and non-legitimate networks. The fact that mobileterminals of 3GPP networks may not distinguish between legitimate andnon-legitimate networks allows attackers to track the subscribers asthey move, as well as eavesdrop on their calls and Short Message Service(SMS).

Within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), there have beendiscussions on how to prevent false base station attacks when thestandardization of 3G began. There were however no countermeasuresintroduced for IMSI catching in 3G. When the standardization of LTEbegan, 3GPP once more discussed protection against IMSI catchers. Againno efficient protection was identified. It should be noted that 3G andLTE did include protection against eavesdropping false base stations ofthe MITM kind. Examples of protection added to 3G and LTE to protectagainst MITM attacks include adding integrity protection to thenegotiation and selection of encryption algorithms, mutualauthentication between the mobile terminal and the network etc. Theseprotection mechanisms may however not be back ported to GSM in anefficient way. The problem with doing that is that the system must becapable of handling legacy mobile terminals that do not have the newupgrades. Conversely, the mobile terminals must be capable ofinterworking with legacy networks that have not been upgradedaccordingly. Since GSM does not have integrity protected capabilitynegotiation between the mobile terminal and the network, an attacker mayplace itself as a MITM, relaying all traffic between the network and themobile terminal, except for that the attacker modifies any capabilityinformation sent to indicate that one of the parties is a legacy entitythat do not support the new functionality. The result of such biddingdown attacks is that the mobile terminal and the network fall back tothe legacy insecure behavior.

The best known way around the problem of bidding down attacks in theabove setting is to introduce a cut-off date, after which legacyequipment will no longer be supported. The effect of this is that oldmobile terminals will no longer be able to call, and new mobileterminals will no longer be able to connect to legacy networks. This isa severe restriction and when this approach is taken it is easy to seethat the cut-off date will be pushed long into the future to avoid thatcustomers are left without service.

One may also envision adding security functions to the protocols inGSM/3G/LTE for protecting the request for the IMSI from the network.However, adding such new functionality would have the same problem withbidding down attacks as identified in the previous paragraph.

A different approach may be to try to detect false base stations insteadof preventing them from working. Once the false base stations aredetected, they may be reported to the authorities, located, e.g., viatriangulation, and removed. The IMSI catcher catcher project (ICC) (seehttps://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/mobile-network-assessment-tools/wiki/CatcherCatcher),is based on a detection principle. ICC is an open source softwareproduct that may be installed on an Android phone and which only worksfor GSM currently. ICC provides an indication of whether the mobileterminal may be connected to a false base station or not. The indicationis either yellow, which indicates that the mobile terminal may beconnected to a false base station, red, which indicates that there isstrong evidence the mobile terminal is connected to a false basestation, or black, which indicates that the mobile terminal is connectedto a false base station for sure. A user may report to the authoritieswhen ICC makes suspicious indications. While providing valuableinformation, a big drawback with this solution is that it requires moretechnical skill than the average user has. Other problems is that thetool is only likely to be used by a small set of security enthusiasts,meaning that continuous and wide coverage of the scans are not likely tohappen. Further an operator needs to have assurance that appropriatemeasures are being taken and may not rely on the goodwill of the whitehat hacker community. Even if the operator started using ICC in theirown operations, it is in many regions prohibitively expensive to havepersonnel continuously moving around scanning the area.

Note that although terminology from 3GPP LTE has been used in thisdisclosure to exemplify the embodiments herein, this should not be seenas limiting the scope of the embodiments herein to only theaforementioned system. Other wireless systems, including WCDMA, WiMax,UMB, GSM network, any 3GPP cellular network or any cellular network orsystem, may also benefit from exploiting the ideas covered within thisdisclosure.

Also note that terminology such as network node and network deviceshould be considering non-limiting and does in particular not imply acertain hierarchical relation between the two; in general “network node”may be considered as a first device, or device 1, and “network device”may be considered as a second device, or device 2, and these two devicesmay communicate with each other over a radio channel. The embodimentsherein further focus on wireless transmissions in the downlink, howeverthe embodiments herein are equally applicable in the uplink.

In this section, the embodiments herein will be illustrated in moredetail by a number of exemplary embodiments. It should be noted thatthese embodiments are not mutually exclusive. Components from oneembodiment may be tacitly assumed to be present in another embodimentand it will be obvious to a person skilled in the art how thosecomponents may be used in the other exemplary embodiments.

Example of embodiments of a method in a first network node for detectingfalse base stations, will now be described with reference to a flowchartdepicted in FIG. 4.

An embodiment of the present invention comprises a method for detectingfalse base stations so that they may later be located and neutralized.The method may be applied to any type of radio access, however the mainaim is to be able to detect false base stations of GSM, UMTS and LTEradio technologies. In particular GSM is of interest. All the methodscollect data on the environment, which is then compared against theexpected environment.

The method may comprise the following actions, which actions may betaken in any suitable order. Dashed lines of a box in FIG. 4 indicatethat this action is not mandatory.

Action 401

The network node sends a message to a network device such as e.g. aradio network node, a radio base station or a mobile terminal, whichmessage comprises configuration data configuring the network device tocollect information transmitted by network nodes located in asurrounding area of the network device. This message may also bereferred to as configuration message or measurement configurationmessage. The network nodes which the network device collects informationfrom, may be any radio transmitter which the network device considers tobe, which may also be referred to as interprets as, a network node, suchas e.g. radio network nodes, radio base stations and/or false basestations impersonating a network node.

The information transmitted by the network nodes in the surrounding areaof the network device may comprise physical cell identifiers, carrierfrequency and/or pilot signal strength. The network node may configurethe network device with a number of criteria on how to collectinformation and performing measurements, such as which frequencies toscan for, how frequently to scan, what physical cell identities to lookfor. The network node 110 may further be configured to request, or mayconfigure the network device to measure on a larger set of frequenciesthan necessary for normal operation as well as on a plurality ofdifferent Radio Access Technologies (RATs), in order to collectinformation that may indicate the presence of a false base station. Theinformation may thus be collected from frequencies and radiotechnologies not used when the network node 110 and network devicecommunicate themselves, which may also be referred to as frequencies andradio technologies other than the ones used when the network node 110and the network device communicate with each other.

In some embodiments herein the network device may be configured tocollect information, which may also be referred to as performmeasurements, based on, which may also be referred to as using, anAutomatic Neighbor Relation (ANR) function.

FIG. 5 shows the functionality of the ANR function and the interactionbetween a radio access node, such as an eNB, and an O&M. The ANRfunction allows the use of network device 120, such as a UE, reportedmeasurements on neighbor cells to identify new neighbors and NeighborRelations (NR) which may be eventually added to a Neighbor RelationTable (NRT) by a RAN node and/or by an OAM system.

The function works by means of collecting UE measurements reportingphysical cell identifiers and other parameters concerning cells in aneighborhood, which may also be referred to as a tracking area. If acell is unknown to the serving RAN node, the network node 110 mayconfigure the network device, such as an UE, to perform furthermeasurements to enable a reporting of information, such as e.g. theglobal cell identity.

The ANR function resides in the eNB and manages the conceptual NeighbourRelation Table (NRT). Located within ANR, the Neighbor DetectionFunction finds new neighbors and adds them to the NRT. ANR also containsthe Neighbor Removal Function which removes outdated NRs. The NeighborDetection Function and the Neighbor Removal Function may beimplementation specific.

An existing Neighbor cell Relation (NR) from a source cell to a targetcell means that eNB serving the source cell knows the E-UTRAN CellGlobal Identifier (ECGI)/Cell Global Identifier (CGI) and the PhysicalCell Identifier (PCI) of the target cell and has an entry in the NRT forthe source cell identifying the target cell.

For each cell that the eNB serves, the eNB keeps a NRT. For each NR, theNRT contains the Target Cell Identifier (TCI), which identifies thetarget cell. For E-UTRAN, the TCI corresponds to the ECGI and PhysicalCell Identifier (PCI) of the target cell.

The ANR function relies on cells broadcasting their identity on a globallevel, ny means of the ECGI and allows the O&M to manage the NRT. TheO&M may add and delete NRs. It may also change the attributes of theNRT. The O&M system may be informed about changes in the NRT.

For Intra-LTE/frequency ANR, the eNB serving a cell with ANR function,instructs each UE to perform measurements on neighboring cells, as apart of a normal call procedure. The eNB may use different policies forinstructing the UE to perform measurements, and when to report themeasurements to the eNB.

When the UE discovers an ECGI of a new cell, which may also be referredto as an unknown cell, the UE reports the detected ECGI to the servingcell eNB. In addition the UE reports the tracking area code and allPublic Land Mobile Network Identities (PLMN IDs) that have beendetected. The eNB adds this neighbor relation to NRT.

For Inter-RAT/Inter-frequency ANR, the eNB serving cell with ANRfunction may instruct a UE to perform measurements and detect cells onother RATs and/or frequencies during connected mode. The eNB may usedifferent policies for instructing the UE to do measurements, and whento report them to the eNB.

The UE may report the PCI of the detected cells in the target RATsand/or frequencies to the eNB. When the eNB receives UE reportscontaining PCIs of cell(s), the eNB may instruct the UE to read the CGIand the RAC of the detected neighbor cell in case the detected cell is aGERAN cell, and CGI, LAC and, RAC in case the detected cell is an UTRANcell. For the interfrequency case, the eNB may instruct the UE to readthe ECGI, TAC and all available PLMN ID(s) of the inter-frequencydetected cell.

The eNB may update its inter-RAT/inter-frequency Neighbour RelationTable after receiving relevant info from the UE.

The ANR function may signal the presence of a new neighbor relation tothe OAM system, which in turn may signal the specific configurationsregarding the newly detected neighbor cell to the RAN node. For example,the neighbor relation table may contain a “no HandOver (HO)” flag, a noX2 interface flag and a no remove flag, all of which may be configuredby the OAM system.

In further embodiments herein, the network device may be configured tocollect information, which may also be referred to as performingmeasurements, based on, which may also be referred to as using, anMinimization of Drive Tests (MDT) function.

The MDT function is an inter RAT function which allows a collection ofevents traces at a network device, such as a UE, upon configuration ofthe events to be monitored and collected from the network node 110, suchas a RAN, to the network device. As an example, FIG. 6 shows how theRAN, which in this case is an UTRAN or an E-UTRAN node, sends to the UEan RRC message containing information on the events and information tostore in the MDT trace.

The MDT trace stored may be retrieved by the network node 110, such ase.g. the RAN, via RRC signaling upon indication from the network device120, such as an UE, that a logged trace is available.

Logged measurements may be of different type, some of them including: 1)A physical cell identity, a pilot signal strength measurement and/or acarrier frequency of: i) a serving cell, ii) intra-frequencyneighbouring cells, iii) inter-frequency neighbouring cells, iv) GERANneighbouring cells, v) UTRAN (if non-serving) neighbouring cells, vi)E-UTRAN (if non-serving) neighbouring cells, and vii) CDMA 2000 (ifserving is E-UTRA) neighbouring cells, 2) UE location information, atone of a number of time occurrences, 3) RRC Connection Establishmentsper cell, and 4) Radio Link Failure events information.

Once the RAN retrieves an MDT trace it may report it to an OAM system,which may analyze it and derive corrective actions to enhance thesystem's performance.

It should be noted that a logging period may be specified by the RAN,implying that the UE may be requested to log the configured events whilemoving within a RAT and across several RATs and for a given timeduration.

In some embodiments the network node 110 may be a serving RAN node, suchas a radio network node.

In a further embodiment the network node 110 may send configurationmessages to one or more network devices.

In a further embodiment of the embodiment based on the MDT function,further measurements may be configured to be reported in the loggedmeasurements traces set by a function of the like of MDT. Suchmeasurements may e.g. comprise: Logs of the number of IMSI retrievalattempts by the serving cell, or Logs of the number of Location AreaUpdate procedures, or Tracking Area Update procedures or any procedureused to report change of UE location to the network

Action 402

The network node 110 receives a message comprising a measurement reportcomprising collected information from the network device.

According to a first aspect of embodiments herein, the measurementreport may be based on measurement reports that mobile terminals inconnected state provide to the network node 110. Such measurementreports may be of the like of what is provided as part of the ANRfunction and may to identify cells in the neighbourhood which have beenunknown to that point in time or with which a neighbour relation has notbeen established. The measurement report may contain information onphysical cell identifiers, carrier frequency and pilot signal strengthof cells in the network device's surroundings. Once the network device,such as a radio network node or a mobile terminal, collects measurementsaccording to the measurement configuration provided by the network node110 in the configuration message in Action 401, the terminal providesmeasurement reports back to the network node 110. The measurementreports may be event based, e.g. reported if one or more of theconditions specified in the measurement configuration is fulfilled, ormay be provided on a regular basis, typically several times a second.

In a further embodiment the network node 110 may receive messagescomprising measurement reports from one or more network devices.

According to a second aspect of embodiments herein, collection ofinformation is based on a function in mobile networks that may besimilar to or same as the Minimization of Drive Tests (MDT) function.The MDT function may activate log traces on a per-mobile terminal basis.The information logged by the terminal and stored in the traces may beof different kinds such as terminal collected measurements, initiatedsignalling procedures, monitored events that were previously defined,such as e.g. signals reaching pre-set thresholds. Activation of the logtracing function may be triggered by a number of events such ashandovers of the mobile terminal to areas which should be scanned fordetection of false bases stations, also referred to as rogue basestations, or detection of anomalies in the cell deployments based on theinformation received from the mobile terminals in connected state.

When the network node 110 activates log tracing in the network device120, such as a mobile terminal, the mobile terminal starts to collectinformation related to the radio environment in its vicinity. Theinformation may be collected while the network device 120 moves withinthe communications network. In some embodiments a first network node mayactivate the log traces function, the network device 120 then performsthe measurement while moving within the communications network and mayreport the measurement to a second network node. The mobile terminal maycollect a wide range of parameters, such as: I) A physical cellidentity, pilot signal strength measurements, and/or a carrier frequencyof: 1) a serving cell, 2) intra-frequency neighbouring cells, 3)inter-frequency neighbouring cells, 4) GERAN neighbouring cells, 5)UTRAN (if non-serving) neighbouring cells, 6) E-UTRAN (if non-serving)neighbouring cells, and 7) CDMA 2000 (if serving is E-UTRA) neighbouringcells; II) a mobile terminal location information, at one of a number oftime occurrences; III) RRC Connection Establishments per cell; IV) RadioLink Failure events information; and/or V) a handover event information.

The network node 110 may request the network device 120, such as themobile terminal, to report the collected data either at the end of apre-set log trace duration or in the middle of a logging period.Alternatively, the logs may be configured to collect and report on anevent basis, in which case the log trace will be indicated by theterminal as ready to be retrieved as soon as the event to be monitoredis recorded, such an event may e.g. occur when leaving a certaintracking area.

In some embodiments, the log traces may be triggered independently fromany previous event, e.g. because an operator is interested in monitoringa given suspect area, or they may be activated as the consequence ofevents previously monitored, such as anomalies reported by means themeasurement reports based on the ANR function. Therefore the MDT basedembodiment described herein may function either in a standalone way orin a combined way together with other embodiments.

Action 403

In a further embodiment, the network node 110 may send a further messageto the network device. The message may comprise configuration dataconfiguring the network device to collect further measurements, whichmay also be referred to as collecting secondary information, from thedetected cells. The message may be sent upon receiving measurementreports based on the first aspect of embodiments herein and/or upondetecting a difference between the received first information and thetarget information. The further measurements may also be based on thefirst aspect of embodiments herein, and may include decoding of commonchannels information such as System Information Blocks (SIBs), which maylead to reporting of parameters like a Cell Global Identity (CGI), aLocation Area Code (LAC), a Tracking Area Code (TAC), a ClosedSubscriber Group Identity (CSG ID) and more in the measurement reportreturned from the network device to the network node 110. Hence, thesecondary information may be a SIB. The second information may bereceived by the network node 110 from the UE according to action 602described above.

Action 404

The network node 110 compares the received information with apredetermined target information in order to determine differencesbetween received and target information, which may also be referred toas determines anomalies in the received information. The anomalies maybe determined, which may also be referred to as being detected, bycomparing the received information with a predetermined targetinformation, after having received the measurement report from thenetwork device. The target information may be cell planning data, whichmay also be referred to as cell planning, cell planning information,cell plans, cell configuration or cell parameter configuration. With theterms cell planning, cell planning information, cell plans, cellconfiguration, cell parameter configuration and similar terms it isintended the set of data known by the network node 110 and providinginformation about the expected cell deployment and cell configuration asplanned by an operator of the network.

An anomaly, also referred to as deviation or difference, between thereceived information and the predetermined target data may indicate thepresence of a false base station. Hence, the network node 110 may detectthe presence of a false base station by determining the anomalies in thereceived information.

When the measurement report is based on the ANR function, anomalies mayconsist of unexpected detection by the terminal of physical cellidentities that were not supposed to be present in the neighborhood ormeasurement of unusually high pilot signal strength from neighboringcells. Such a presence of additional cell identities or unusually highpilot signal strength compared to the target information, may indicatethe presence of a false base station. Hence, the difference between thereceived information and the target information may be detected based onthe pilot signal strength or on a presence of additional cellidentities.

The network node 110 receiving the measurement reports or any othernetwork node 110 to which the measurement reports may be forwarded, maycompare such results with a list of cells supposed to be present in theserving cell's neighborhood. The measurement reports may be forwardedwithout any modification of the measurement results or the measurementresult may be processed and forwarded in the form of information deducedfrom the measurement report. The network node receiving the measurementreport may be a radio network node and the network node to which themeasurement reports may be forwarded to may be any other network nodesuch as a core network node, such as e.g. MSC, MME, nodes related toO&M, OAM, OSS or SON, positioning node, such as e.g. E-SMLC, or a noderelated to MDT.

In case further measurements have been performed according to Action603, anomalies may also be detected on the basis of such furtherreported information. This may be done by comparing the secondaryinformation with a secondary target information. For example, an anomalymay consist of identifying a given TAC or LAC that is not supposed to beassigned to a cell with the reported physical cell identifier and CGIaccording to the predetermined target information. Hence, the comparisonmay comprise verifying that a given cell identifier and CGI in thesecondary information are assigned to the same TAC or LAC as in thesecondary target information.

The embodiment above may be used to trigger other procedures such asthose described in other embodiments herein.

According to a second aspect of embodiments herein, the measurementreport received by the network node 110 may be based on a functionsimilar to or same as the Minimization of Drive Tests (MDT) function asdescribed in Action 602. The anomalies that may be monitored, which mayalso be referred to as the differences between the received informationand the target information that may be detected, in order to identify afalse base station amongst the network nodes in the communicationsnetwork, may be one or more of: I) An unexpected and/or unknown physicalcell identifier is monitored; II) An unexpected and/or unknown CGI ismonitored; III) An unexpected and/or unknown LAC or TAC is monitored forthe Physical Cell Identifier and/or CGI of the measured cell; IV)Unusually high pilot signal strength is monitored for a serving orneighbor cell. The latter measurement may be compared with pilot signalstrength of other neighboring cells. In some embodiments, if the signalstrength of a cell serving the network device is within normal rangesbut a neighbor pilot signal strength is higher than expected, given theserving signal strength power, the neighbor signal strength may bedeemed anomalous. In a similar way, if the monitored neighbor cellssignal is within expected ranges, but the serving signal strength ishigher than expected, given the serving signal strength power, theserving signal strength may be deemed anomalous; and V) An unusualsequence of signaling procedures is triggered, such as for example: 1)RRC connection attempts to unexpected monitored cells; 2) RRC Connectionattempts not followed by handover procedures but followed by new RRCattempts in a different cell. This may indicate that the UE was notproperly handed over by a possibly false base station, which may also bereferred to as a rogue base station, but instead was dropped, which mayalso be referred to as was released, from the base station and let tore-connect to a new cell; and 3) RRC Connection attempts followed byRadio Link Failures (RLFs) while the signal strength of the serving cellis reasonably high, i.e. such a signal strength which normally would notbe the cause of an RLF.

The network node 110, e.g. the OAM system, may also be aware of the basestation type corresponding to a given cell identifier monitored andreported by the network device in the log traces. Namely, the networknode 110 may be aware that a certain cell identifier corresponds to acertain cell, such as e.g. a pico cell, and that transmission power forsuch a cell may not exceed a given threshold. The value of the thresholdmay be dependent on the capabilities of the RAT used, such as e.g. themaximum transmission power which the network node are being designedfor. The value of the threshold may further be dependent on the networkdevices distance to the network node 110, where the threshold value maybe a scaling of the maximum transmission power of the network nodeserving the cell, such that the threshold is decreases with anincreasing distance between the network device 120 and the network node.In some embodiments herein the threshold may further be dependent on thephysical environment in which the network node serving the cell isplaced. Based on the above, it will be obvious to a person skilled inthe art how the threshold should be selected. In some embodiments hereinthe threshold may be e.g. 24 dBm. Hence, a transmission power measuredfrom a cell which is exceeding the threshold may be an indicaton of afalse base station. In some further embodiments herein, the samecomparison may be performed using the pilot signal strength instead ofthe transmission power, or the measured pilot signal strength may be anindication of the transmission power. Therefore an anomalous pilotsignal strength may also be deduced by the comparison between the loggedmeasurements for a cell and the expected pilot signal strength given theknown cell type of the cell.

Action 405

The network node 110 provides an indication that a false base stationmay be present when the collected information differs from the targetinformation, or if there is a deviation or anomaly between the loggeddata and the data expected from cell planning and configuration. Theindication may be provided by triggering an alarm, which may raise thealert level, or raising a warning message providing an alert on apossible presence of a false or rogue base station in the area.

In a further embodiment, the radio network nodes in the network may beconfigured to collect information without relying on the support ofmobile terminals. Hence, in this embodiment the network device may be aradio network node.

As stated in previous embodiments, this information may comprisephysical cell identifier, carrier frequency or pilot signal strengthmeasurements for cells in the neighborhood. Additionally the informationcollected may comprise common channels information such as SIBs andcomprising parameters like LAC, TAC, CGI or CSG ID.

In this case, the base stations may be configured to receive signalsfrom surrounding network nodes, which may also be referred to as basestations. The signals may be interpreted on an abstract level, i.e. thebase station receiving the signal uses it only based on with which powera signal on a given frequency is present. The receiving radio networknode or a different network node, to which the measured information maybe forwarded, compares a received signal power pattern to the expectedsignal power pattern according to the cell planning information, whichindicate the expected cells present in the neighborhood.

An alternative approach is to interpret the signals more concretely.That is, the receiving radio network node parses the received signals asradio protocols and deduces more granular information about thetransmitter. For example, the receiving radio network node may listenfor cell identifiers broadcast by neighboring radio network nodes. Thereceived information may again be compared with the expected resultaccording to the cell planning.

In a further embodiment, a GSM only case may be applied as a specialcase of the above embodiments. The mobile terminal may measure downlinkreceived signal level from the serving cell and received signal levelfrom surrounding cells.

A MEASurement RESult (MEAS RES) procedure may be used by the radionetwork node, such as a BTS, to report the measurements made by thenetwork device 120, such as e.g. a Mobile Station, to a network node,such as e.g. a Base Station Controller (BSC). One of the measurements isencompassed in RxLev parameter, which is a measure of the signalstrength. The MEAS RES procedure is specified in 3GPP TS 48.058 V12.0.0and the RxLev parameter is specified in 3GPP TS 45.008 V12.3.0.

The decision if a false base station is may be made by the network node110, such as the BSC, where e.g. a value of RxLev=63 may indicate aninterfering IMSI catcher.

The network node 110, such as the BSC, may also combine measurementreports from several BTS/mobile terminals, and may use a statisticalapproach to calculate the probability that a RxLev value correlates withan IMSI catcher.

In all of the embodiments, the comparison of the received data againstthe expected outcome may be performed in a radio network node, or inanother network node to which the radio network node may forward thedata, such as e.g. a core network node, a node in the OAM system or adistributed node. The node in the OAM system may collect data fromseveral different radio network nodes and perform a statistical analysisover a combined set of data. Hence, the collected information and thetarget information may be averaged over a plurality of network devices.When the data is collected by another node in the OAM system, it is notnecessary that this node itself provides an indication of a suspectedfalse base station. Instead the OAM system may provide the indication ortake an action based on a corresponding analysis of the receivedcollected data.

Although the expected values are represented by the cell plan in theabove description, it is clear that other measures of what to beexpected may also be used. For example, a general signalling strength asmandated by regulators is not exceeded by a legitimate base station, butmay be exceeded by a false base station trying to attract mobileterminals. Hence, if a measured signalling strength from one of thenetwork nodes is higher than a threshold, which threshold may be thesignalling strength mandated by regulators, this network node isidentified as possibly being a false base station. In order to confirmthat the network node being identified as a possible false base stationactually is a false base station, further measurements may be performedaccording to the embodiments described above.

In some embodiments herein, the difference between the collectedinformation and the target information may be averaged over a pluralityof network devices, or over a plurality of measurements made by a singlenetwork device, or over a plurality of measurements made by a pluralityof network devices.

Embodiments herein are written from the perspective that the networknode performing the analysis is a radio base station, which may also bereferred to as a radio network node. However, the radio base station mayjust as well forward the data for analysis in a more central node thatperforms the comparisons and raises an indication or take some otheraction when a suspected false base station is identified.

A core network node, such as an OAM node, may also be adapted toconfigure a radio network node to perform the measurements forcollecting information transmitted by network nodes in a surrounding,which may also be referred to as a tracking area, of the radio networknode. The radio network node may send a measurement report to the corenetwork node, which core network node may determine anomalies ininformation received in the measurement report.

In a further embodiment the core network node, such as an OAM node, mayalso be adapted to configure a radio network node to configure a networkdevice to perform the measurements for collecting informationtransmitted by network nodes in a surrounding area, which may also bereferred to as a tracking area, of the network device 120. The networkdevice 120 may send a measurement report to the radio network node,which may forward the report to a core network node. Anomalies in theinformation received in the measurement report may be determined by thecore network node.

In some embodiments herein, the configuration may be triggered by anevent, which event may be a handover or a detection of a pilotsignalling strength exceeding a threshold value. Herein, configurationshall be interpreted as the configuring of the network device 120.Hence, the performing of the method disclosed herein, according toactions 401 to 405, may also be triggered by the same events, such as ahandover or a detection of a pilot signalling strength exceeding athreshold value.

According to a further aspect of embodiments herein, the object may beachieved by a method, performed by a network device 120, for detectingfalse base stations.

In one embodiment herein, the network device 120 may receive a messagecomprising configuration data from a network node 110.

The network device 120 may further perform measurements according to thereceived configuration data, in order to collect information transmittedby network nodes in a tracking area of the network device 120. Thenetwork nodes may be any radio transmitter which the network deviceconsiders to be, which may also be referred to as interprets as, anetwork node, such as e.g. radio network nodes, radio base stationsand/or false base stations impersonating a network node.

The network device 120 may further send a message comprising ameasurement report comprising collected information to the network node110.

Example of embodiments of a method in a network device 120 for detectingfalse base stations in a communications network 100, will now bedescribed with reference to a flowchart depicted in FIG. 7.

The method may comprise the following actions, which actions may betaken in any suitable order. Dashed lines of a box in FIG. 7 indicatethat this action is not mandatory.

Action 701

The network device 120 may receive a message comprising configurationdata from the network node 110, which message comprises configurationdata configuring the network device to collect information transmittedby network nodes in a surrounding area of the network device.

Action 702

The network device 120 may perform measurements according to thereceived configuration data, in order to collect information transmittedby the network nodes in the tracking area of the network device 120. Themeasurements may be based on the ANR function or the MDT function.

Action 703

The network device 120 may further send a message comprising themeasurement report comprising collected information to the network node110.

To perform the method actions for detecting false base stationsdescribed above in relation to FIG. 4, the network node 110 may comprisethe following arrangement depicted in FIG. 8.

The network node 110 comprises a communication unit 801 to communicatewith network devices. The communication unit 802 may e.g. be an X2 or anS1 interface.

The network node 110 is configured to, e.g. by means of a sendingcircuit 802 being configured to, send a message to a network device,which message comprises configuration data configuring the networkdevice to collect information transmitted by other radio sources. Thenetwork node 110 is further configured to, or comprises a receivingcircuit 803 configured to, receive a message comprising a measurementreport comprising collected information from the network device.

The network node 110 may further be configured to, e.g. by means of adetermining module 805 further being configured to, determine anomaliesin the received information. The anomalies may be determined, which mayalso be referred to as being detected, by comparing the receivedinformation with a predetermined target information, after havingreceived the measurement report from the network device. The targetinformation may be cell planning data, which may also be referred to ascell planning, cell planning information, cell plans, cell configurationor cell parameter configuration. With the terms cell planning, cellplanning information, cell plans, cell configuration, cell parameterconfiguration and similar terms it is intended the set of data known bythe network node or OAM node and providing information about theexpected cell deployment and cell configuration as planned by anoperator of the network.

In another embodiment herein the network node 110 may further beconfigured to, e.g. by means of an indicating module 806 further beingconfigured to, provide an indication that a false base station may bepresent when the collected information differs from the targetinformation, or if there is a deviation or anomaly between the loggeddata and the data expected from cell planning and configuration.

The embodiments herein for detecting false base stations may beimplemented through one or more processors, such as the processing unit804 in the network node 110 depicted in FIG. 8, together with computerprogram code for performing the functions and actions of the embodimentsherein. The program code mentioned above may also be provided as acomputer program product, for instance in the form of a data carriercarrying computer program code for performing the embodiments hereinwhen being loaded into the in the network node 110. One such carrier maybe in the form of a CD ROM disc. It is however feasible with other datacarriers such as a memory stick. The computer program code mayfurthermore be provided as pure program code on a server and downloadedto the network node 110.

The network node 110 may further comprise a memory 807 comprising one ormore memory units. The memory 807 is arranged to be used to storeobtained information, measurements, data, configurations, schedulings,and applications to perform the methods herein when being executed inthe network node 110.

To perform the method actions for detecting false base stationsdescribed above in relation to FIG. 7, the network device 120 maycomprise the following arrangement depicted in FIG. 9. The networkdevice 120 may be configured to, e.g. by means of a receiving circuit901 being configured to, receive a message from the network node, whichmessage comprises configuration data configuring the network device tocollect information transmitted by other radio sources.

The network device 120 may further be configured to, or comprises ameasurement circuit 902 configured to, perform measurements according tothe received configuration data, in order to collect informationtransmitted by network nodes in the tracking area of the network device.

The network device 120 may further be configured to, or comprises asending circuit 803 configured to, send a message comprising ameasurement report comprising collected information from the networkdevice 120.

The embodiments herein for detecting a false base station may beimplemented through one or more processors, such as the processing unit904 in the network device 120 depicted in FIG. 9, together with computerprogram code for performing the functions and actions of the embodimentsherein. The program code mentioned above may also be provided as acomputer program product, for instance in the form of a data carriercarrying computer program code for performing the embodiments hereinwhen being loaded into the in the network node 120. One such carrier maybe in the form of a CD ROM disc. It is however feasible with other datacarriers such as a memory stick. The computer program code mayfurthermore be provided as pure program code on a server and downloadedto the network node 120.

The network device 120 may further comprise a memory 905 comprising oneor more memory units. The memory 905 is arranged to be used to storeobtained information, measurements, data, configurations, scheduling,and applications to perform the methods herein when being executed inthe network node 120.

Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the determiningmodule 805, the indicating module 806 and the measuring circuit 902described above may refer to a combination of analog and digitalcircuits, and/or one or more processors configured with software and/orfirmware, e.g. stored in the memory 807, that when executed by the oneor more processors such as the processing unit 804 as described above.One or more of these processors, as well as the other digital hardware,may be included in a single Application-Specific Integrated Circuitry(ASIC), or several processors and various digital hardware may bedistributed among several separate components, whether individuallypackaged or assembled into a system-on-a-chip (SoC).

When using the word “comprise” or “comprising” it shall be interpretedas non-limiting, i.e. meaning “consist at least of”. When using the word“set” herein, it shall be interpreted as meaning “one or more”.

The embodiments herein are not limited to the above described preferredembodiments. Various alternatives, modifications and equivalents may beused. Therefore, the above embodiments should not be taken as limitingthe scope of the invention, which is defined by the appending claims.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method performed by a network node fordetecting a false base station in a communications network, whichnetwork node operates in the communication network and wherein thenetwork node is adapted to serve a network device via a serving radioaccess node, the method comprising: sending a message to a networkdevice, which message comprises configuration data configuring thenetwork device to collect information transmitted by network nodes in asurrounding area of the network device; receiving, from the networkdevice, a message comprising a physical cell identifier (PCI) that thenetwork device determined from synchronization signals received by thenetwork device, wherein the synchronization signals were transmitted bya second base station neighboring the first base station; determiningwhether the second base station is a false base station based on the PCIreceived from the network device; and providing an indication that afalse base station is present in response to determining that the secondbase station is a false base station.
 2. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: sending a second message to the network device configuringthe network device to collect a secondary information.
 3. The method ofclaim 2, wherein the secondary information is a System InformationBlock.
 4. The method of claim 2, wherein the comparison comprisesverifying that a given cell identifier and Cell Global Identity in thesecondary information are assigned to the same Tracking Area Code orLocation Area Code as in the secondary target information.
 5. The methodof claim 2, wherein the network node configures the network device toperform measurements based on a Minimization to Drive Test function. 6.The method of claim 1, wherein the information transmitted by thenetwork nodes comprises physical cell identifiers, carrier frequenciesand pilot signal strengths.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein theinformation is collected from frequencies and radio technologies notused when the network node and network device communicate themselves. 8.The method of claim 1, further comprising comparing information receivedfrom the UE regarded the second base station's pilot signal strength totarget information relating to pilot signal strength of base stationsneighboring the first base station.
 9. The method of claim 1, whereinthe first base station receives PCI information from a plurality ofplurality of network devices, the indication that the second basestation is a false base station being provided only the PCI for thesecond base station reported by the network device is corroborated bythe plurality of network devices.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein thenetwork node configures the network device to perform measurements usingan Automatic Neighbor Relation function.
 11. The method of claim 1,wherein the configuration is triggered by an event, which event is ahandover or a detection of a pilot signaling strength exceeding athreshold value.
 12. The method of claim 1, wherein determining whetherthe second base station is a false base station based on the PCIreceived from the network device comprises: determining whether the PCIreceived from the network device is included in a list of PCIsmaintained by the network node.
 13. The method of claim 12, whereindetermining whether the second base station is a false base stationbased on the PCI received from the network device comprises: instructingthe network device to obtain secondary information as a result ofdetermining that the PCI received from the network device is notincluded in the list of PCIs maintained by the network node.
 14. Themethod of claim 13, wherein the secondary information comprises one ormore of: a Cell Global Identity (CGI), a Location Area Code (LAC), and aTracking Area Code (TAC), and the network node determines whether thesecond base station is a false base station based on the secondaryinformation.
 15. A network node for performing a method for detecting afalse base station in a communications network, which network nodeoperates in the communication network and wherein the network node isadapted to serve a network device via a serving radio access node,wherein the network node is configured to: send a message to a networkdevice, which message comprises configuration data for configuring thenetwork device to collect information transmitted by network nodes in asurrounding area of the network device, receive, from the networkdevice, a message comprising a physical cell identifier (PCI) that thenetwork device determined from synchronization signals received by thenetwork device, wherein the synchronization signals were transmitted bya second base station neighboring the first base station, determinewhether the second base station is a false base station based on the PCIreceived from the network device; and provide an indication that a falsebase station is present in response to determining that the second basestation is a false base station.